In 2015, Sun et al. proposed an improved directed digital signature scheme using a non-interactive public-key distribution system. Sun et al. claimed that their proposed directed digital signature scheme is secure to message forgery attacks. However, this paper points out that Sun et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to message forgery attacks unlike their claims. For this reason, Sun et al.'s scheme is insecure for practical application.
Introduction
In 1991, Maurer and Yacobi [1] proposed an identity-based non-interactive public-key distribution system based on a novel trapdoor one-way hash function of exponentiation modulo of a composite number. In 1998, Tseng et al. [2] improved the squaring method based on the Maurer and Yacobi scheme and then proposed a directed digital signature scheme, a user identification scheme, and a conference key distribution system [3, 4] .
However, in 2015, Sun et al. [5] proved that Tseng et al.'s scheme cannot prevent a forgery attack. It means that any user can easily forge a signature to get any message successfully and then declare that it is generated by other users in the Tseng et al. ' This section briefly reviews Sun et al.'s directed digital signature scheme [5] . 
System Initialization Phase
The trusted authority generates system parameters as follows:
1. N denotes the product of four primes p j which are between 60 and 70 decimal digits, where the numbers (p j − 1)/2 are odd and pair-wise relatively prime.
2. e denotes an integer in Z * ϕ(N ) and the secret value d is satisfied by the equation e · d ≡ 1(modϕ(N )), where ϕ is the Euler's totient function.
User Registration Phase
Suppose that a user U A wants to join the system presents with his/her unique identity ID A . The user registration phase performs as follows:
1. The trusted authority randomly chooses a secret number t from Z * ϕ(N ) .
2. The trusted authority computes s A for U A in secret as follows:
where g is a primitive element in GF (p j ).
The trusted authority computes
4. The trusted authority publishes {N, g, e, h(·)} and keeps {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , t, v, d} secret, where h(·) is a secure one-way function.
5. The legal user U A publishes ID A and keeps s A secret.
Directed Digital Signature Phase
Assume the legal user U A wants to sign a message M and send it to the specific receiver U B . The signature generation procedure performs as follows:
1. U A chooses a random integer k in Z * N and computes the signature (r, s) for message M as follows:
2. U A sends (M, r, s) to U B .
3. Upon receiving (M, r, s), U B can verify the signature of the message M by the following equation:
4. If the above verified equation holds, the signature for message M by U A is verified. The specific verifier only verifies the validity of the signature for message M by the unique identity of the signer.
Message Forgery Attack on Sun et al.'s Directed Digital Signature Scheme
This section demonstrates that Sun et al.'s directed digital signature scheme [5] cannot withstand a message forgery attack. Assume the sender U A generates the signature (r, s) for the message M and then sends it to a specified receiver U B . In general, the value {M, r, s} are only generated by the sender U A . However, in the Sun et al.'s scheme, the receiver U B can easily forge the signature (r , s ) for the message M and then declare that the signature (r , s ) is generated by the sender U A . For example, the receiver U B can easily forge the signature (r , s ) for the message M as follows:
2. U B computes the forged signature (r , s ) for message M as follows:
3. U B finally sends the forged signature (r , s ) for message M to a specified receiver.
4. Upon receiving (M , r , s ), the specified receiver will verify the signature of the message M by the following equation:
Because the above verified equation always holds, the forged signature (r , s ) for message M by the user U B is also verified correctly.
The forged signature (r , s ) for message M is verified correctly as follows:
Therefore, U B can forge the signature for any message and then declare that the signature is generated by U A . In other words, the user can easily forge the signature and then declare that it is generated by the other user. The problem is that any user U A or U B can easily compute (ID 
Conclusions
This paper reviewed Sun et al.'s directed digital signature scheme and then pointed out that the scheme is still vulnerable to message forgery attacks unlike their claims. Consequently, Sun et al.'s scheme is insecure for practical application. Further works will be focused on improving Sun et al.'s scheme which can be able to provide greater security and to be more efficient than the existing digital signature schemes by an accurate performance analysis.
